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Recent Developments
CRIMINAL LAW - Abduction Of A Female Under The Age
Of Eighteen For The Purpose Of Marriage. State v. Camp, 67
Wash. 357, 407 P.2d 824 (1965). In March, 1963, the defendant,
who was then forty-four years old, became engaged to a seventeen
year old girl. The girl was a junior-high school dropout and worked
part-time as a bookkeeper in the defendant's home. Her parents had
allowed the two to become engaged, but refused permission for mar-
riage until the girl reached eighteen.' In April, 1963, the two were
married and promptly informed her parents of what they had done.
The girl's parents complained to the local authorities, and the defen-
dant was charged with abduction. Subsequently, the parents petitioned
the court to dismiss the charge. The trial judge refused their petition,
and the defendant was convicted of abduction and sentenced to ten years
in the state penitentiary.2 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed,
stating that the subsequent consent of the parents to the marriage was
immaterial. By statute the trial judge could, at his discretion and in
the furtherance of justice, refuse to dismiss the prosecution.
Washington is one of a limited number of states having an
abduction statute which expressly prohibits the taking of an underage
female for the purpose of marriage without the consent of her parents
or legal guardians.3 These statutes apparently are aimed at preventing
what is often an unsuccessful union. They also attempt, perhaps, to dis-
courage those rascals who seek to entice young heiresses into marriage
for the obvious monetary benefit. The latter is not a common problem
in this century, but it did form the impetus for many of these laws.'
Statutory definitions of abduction generally set forth some specific
purpose as an essential element of the crime. Examples include abduc-
1. Rsv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 26.04.210 (Supp. 1965) requires parental consent
for the marriage of a female under eighteen.
2. REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 9.79.050 (1961) provides in part:
(1) Abduction. Every person who . . . shall take a female under the age of
eighteen years for the purpose of prostitution, of sexual intercourse, or without
the consent of her father, mother, guardian or other person having legal charge
of her person, for the purpose of marriage . . . shall be guilty of abduction and
punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years
or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both.
On appeal, the sentence was suspended upon the condition that the defendant serve
one year in jail and that he have no contact whatsoever with his wife during that
year. State v. Camp, 67 Wash. 357, 407 P.2d 825, 826 (1965).
3. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 81 (1956) (under 16) ; MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28 :203 (1962) (under 16) ; N.J. STrAT. ANN. 2A:86-3 (1953) (under 18); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70 (taking of female under 18 years prohibited) ; TEXAS PENAL CODE
ANN. art. 1180 (1961) (under 14).
4. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 96-97 (1957).
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tion for unlawful sexual intercourse, prostitution, concubinage or
cohabitation. The Maryland Abduction Statute prohibits the entice-
ment, persuasion or forcible abduction of any female under the age of
eighteen for the purposes of "prostitution, fornication or concubinage." 5
This law does not expressly prohibit the taking of such a girl for the
purpose of marriage without the consent of her parents or guardians.
It is usually held that a conviction under an abduction statute requires
evidence clearly showing not only a taking within the meaning of the
statute, but also a taking for a purpose specified in the statute.' It
appears, therefore, that the defendant here could not have been convicted
of the crime of abduction in Maryland.
Maryland does have other statutes, however, which could affect
this area. One statute states that a person who takes or detains a
female unlawfully against her will, with the intent to compel her by
force, threats, persuasions, menace or duress to marry him, is guilty
of pandering. 7 Obviously, this does not directly apply to the facts in
Camp, although it could quite arguably be the basis of prosecution in
similar situations.8 Further, any person who knowingly makes a
material false statement to procure, or to assist any other person to
procure, any license or marriage ceremony in violation of the marriage
laws is guilty of and punishable for perjury.9 A successful abduction
and marriage without the consent of the underage female's parents or
guardians could probably be prosecuted under this statute. Whether
the state would prosecute in such cases must rightfully depend upon
the authorities and their determination of the degree of danger to the
public interest.'0
It would appear that the parents in this case would have had little
chance of obtaining a dismissal nolle prosequi in Maryland after with-
drawal of their complaint. Aside from a possible constitutional power
in the governor," the discretion not to prosecute appears reserved
solely for the state prosecutor. Since there are no Maryland statutes,
the common law would prevail, and the court would have no power to
enter a nolle prosequi to a good indictment or to dismiss a criminal
prosecution except at the instance of the prosecutor.'
5. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 1 (1957).
6. Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144, 150 N.E. 882 (1926) ; Common-
wealth v. Nickerson, 5 Allen (Mass.) 518 (1862). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.
322 (1932).
7. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 27, § 426 (1957).
8. There have been no appeals under this specific section of the statute. The
pandering law is generally used to curb prostitution on Baltimore's "Block". See
Mazer v. State, 231 Md. 40, 188 A.2d 552 (1962). The state might encounter some
difficulty with the requirement of a taking "against her will." The circumstances of
the girl's age, intelligence and social maturity could bring the defendant within the
statute under unusual circumstances.
9. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 9-11 (1957).
10. State v. Camp, 67 Wash. 357, 407 P.2d 824 (1965).
11. MD. CONST. art. II, § 20. The governor clearly has the power to grant
reprieves and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures. The power to grant a nolle
prosequi is not affirmatively given, although it could be implied from the language
in this section.
12. Commonwealth v. Condiff, 149 Ky. 37, 147 S.W. 767 (1912) ; State v. Frazier,
52 La. App. 1305, 27 So. 799 (1900). See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 240 (1930).
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LANDLORD AND TENANT - Retaliatory Eviction-Right
To Inform Of Housing Code Violations. Habib v. Edwards, Civil
No. LT 75895-65, D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., Landlord & Tenant Branch,
Oct. 28, 1965; 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2242. Defendant tenant complained
to the District of Columbia housing authorities of housing code viola-
tions by his landlord. The landlord retaliated by bringing eviction
proceedings against the tenant. The District of Columbia Landlord
and Tenant Court, per Judge Harold M. Green, in an unreported
memorandum opinion set aside a default judgment in favor of the land-
lord and ruled that the United States Constitution prohibits any party
from interfering with a citizen's right to inform the government of
violations of the law.' The case then came up for jury trial, but the
court refused evidence of the landlord's motive and granted a directed
verdict for the landlord.2 The tenant then moved for a stay pending
appeal,3 which was subsequently granted by a per curiam order of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.4 This appeal is now
pending.
In a similar case, Tarver v. G & C Construction Corp.,5 a United
States District Court held that an eviction for complaining to local
health authorities constituted a violation of the constitutional right of
the tenant to petition for a redress of grievances. The court reasoned
that state action violative of the fourteenth amendment would result
from enforcement by a court of an eviction order instituted in retalia-
tion for the tenant's act of disclosure. Judge Green, however, rejected
the reasoning of Tarver and refused to base his ruling on any specific
article or amendment of the Constitution. Instead, he felt that a
tenant had a broad constitutional right to inform the authorities and
be free from retaliation for such disclosure.
In In re Quarles,6 the Supreme Court said:
The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law, like the
right of a prisoner in custody upon a charge of such violation, to
be protected against lawless violence does not depend upon any
amendment of the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and
establishment by the Constitution, itself, of a national government,
permanent and supreme within its sphere of action.7
Relying on this principle, Judge Green concluded that the court should
not allow itself to be used as a vehicle to assist the landlord in de-
priving the tenant of his constitutional rights. It is notable that Judge
Green's reasoning has been clearly approved by Judge Wright of the
1. Habib v. Edwards, Civil No. LT 75895-65, D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., Landlord &
Tenant Branch, Oct. 28, 1965.
2. Id. (Nov. 18, 1965).
3. The motion was initially denied in the Municipal Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, Civil No. 3957, 1965 Term.
4. Edwards v. Habib, No. 19812, D.C. Cir., Dec. 3, 1965.
5. Civil No. 64-2945, S.D. N.Y., Nov. 9, 1964 (unreported decision).
6. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
7. Id. at 536. Accord, Motes v. U.S., 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Roviaro v. U.S.,
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in a concurring opinion
to the per curiam order of that court.'
The Tarver and Habib cases illustrate one aspect of the plight
of the slum tenantY With the growing awareness of the problems of
the poor on the part of governmental agencies and the public generally,
it can be expected that cases similar to these will appear in greater
numbers in the near future.
TORTS - Limitations On Actions In Medical Malpractice
Cases. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
On June 16, 1961, defendant performed an operation upon plaintiff
for a fracture of the ankle. For an unspecified time thereafter, defen-
dant continued to treat plaintiff for this injury. On September 2, 1964,
plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging (1) malpractice in the conduct of
the operation; and (2) malpractice during the post-operative treatment.
Defendant filed a plea of limitations.' The trial court granted defen-
dant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the
statute of limitations barred the action.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court erred
in entering this judgment, since the Maryland Rules do not provide for
judgment on the pleadings. The court then went on to state that, as a
matter of substantive law, the general rule in Maryland is that the
statute of limitations on causes of action begins to run from the date
of the alleged wrong, not from the date of its discovery. However, in
many medical malpractice cases, the lay victim does not become cog-
nizant of injury until after limitations have run. Consequently, the
court stated that two exceptions to the general rule have evolved in
some states in medical malpractice cases. First, where the doctor-
patient relationship is terminated immediately after the alleged injurious
act, i.e., where there is no continuing treatment, the statute begins to
run only when the patient discovers, or reasonably should have dis-
covered, the injury. Second, where there is continuing treatment, the
court said, "[T]he cause of action ... accrues at the end of the treat-
ment . . . , unless the patient sooner knew or reasonably should have
8. See note 4, supra.
9. For an enlightening article dealing with the problems of slum housing, see
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519,
especially 541-52 (1966). See also Note, 12 How. L.J. 137 (1966).
1. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 57, § 1 (1964) : "All actions ... on the case.., actions
of debt on simple contract, . . .all actions for trespass for injuries to real or personal
property . . . shall be commenced . . .within three years from the time the cause
of action accrued ....
See also McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930), where the court
determined that the negligent extraction of wrong teeth was either an action as
trespass, case or contract and was, therefore, within the three-year limitations on
actions. Only 17 states have statutes of limitations expressly applicable to medical
malpractice actions. See generally LOUISLL & WILLIAMs, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE CASES f[ 13.01, at n.1 (2d ed. 1965).
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known of the injury or harm, in which case the statute would start
to run with actual or constructive knowledge."'
Some reservations must be entered in respect to the latter excep-
tion. Although it apparently embraces the facts of the principal case,3
it poses a basic problem when considered in conjunction with the first
exception. This, of course, is that an injury may remain undiscovered
for considerably longer than three years after the end of continuing
treatment. 4 The court did not specifically address itself to this difficulty.
It did, however, examine and restate with approval an earlier Maryland
case, Hahn v. Claybrook,5 and held, "The right of action for injury
or damage from malpractice may accrue when the patient knows or
should know he has, suffered injury or damage."6 This proposition
does not limit recovery to cases where discovery was made before the
end of treatment.7 Thus, on the basis of Hahn, the statute might
begin to run whenever the patient discovers, or reasonably should have
discovered, the injury, irrespective of the time of the act or the end
of treatment.
There are two conflicting basic policies in this area: (1) protec-
tion of the doctor from stale lawsuits; and (2) protection of the patient
from physicians whose negligence may not become evident within the
statutory period of limitations.8 If there is agreement that, for purposes
of limitations, the time of the act is not controlling where the patient
does not until later discover his injury, there is no reason to attach
2. 241 Md. at 142,215 A.2d at 828 (emphasis added). The end of treatment
has been employed as the point in time from which the statute of limitations runs in
two situations: (1) where no specific act can be isolated from a course of treatment
as the time of injury; (2) in some states, in cases where the injury is clearly deter-
minable, but is followed by subsequent treatment of the injury or by continuation of
the treatment from which the injury initially arose. See LouIStLL & WILLIAMS, op. cit.
supra note 1, 13.06, at 369, and 13.08, at 371.
3. Counsel for plaintiff informed the R~vInw that both the end of treatment and
the discovery of injury occurred after September 2, 1961, i.e., within three years of
the filing of the complaint.
4. The Supreme Court has recognized that some injuries are "inherently un-
knowable." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949). There, a three-year limita-
tion on actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act did not bar an employee's
action for contraction of silicosis over 30 years, where the action was brought within
three years of his discovery of the disease.
5. 130 Md. 179, 100 At. 83 (1917).
6. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966).
7. This conflict may be explained by the facts of Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179,
100 Atl. 83 (1917). There,.from 1904 through 1910, defendant prescribed argentum
oxide for plaintiff. In 1908, plaintiff began to notice a gray-blue discoloration of certain
parts of her body, symptomatic of a condition known as argyria. Plaintiff did not file
her complaint until 1915. The court held that plaintiff was barred by the three-year
statute, since "when she began to be discolored that showed an injury .. .of which she
had a right to complain . . . and the statute began to run from the time of the discovery
of the alleged injury. . . ." 130 Md. at 187, 100 At. at 86. The Hahn case is, therefore,
a situation of discovery "sooner" than the end of treatment. The language quoted
supra is dictum, however persuasive, to the extent that it is relied upon as authority
for the application of the discovery principle to situations of discovery later than the
end of treatment.
8. See Lindquist v. Mullens, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954) (dissent-
ing opinion).
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similarly inordinate significance to the time of the end of treatment.
The time of reasonable discovery principle is the better rule,9 and it
should not be affected by such arbitrary fixed times as the act itself or
the end of treatment.
Since the court acknowledges that the principal case could be dis-
posed of on procedural grounds, its reasoning on the substantive law
is dictum. Moreover, since not only the discovery of the injury but
also the end of treatment apparently occurred within three years of
the filing of the complaint, the case does not clearly decide that the
time of reasonable discovery principle will be applied in Maryland in
situations of discovery after, as well as before, the end of treatment.
TRADE REGULATION - Presently Injured Private Party
Has Cause Of Action For Treble Damages For Violation Of Section 7
Of Clayton Act. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Bostitch, the largest manufacturer of metal
fastening devices in the United States, acquired the stock of Calwire,
Inc., a manufacturer of industrial pneumatic nailing tools, nails and
staples. Plaintiffs were independent distributors for Calwire's holding
company, Calnail, Inc. As a result of Bostitch's acquisition, plaintiffs'
distributorships were cancelled. Plaintiffs brought a private antitrust
action, seeking treble damages and a divestiture decree, charging that
defendant had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act' and section 7
of the Clayton Act.2 Defendant moved under Rule 12(b) (6) to dis-
miss the Clayton Act charge on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a claim.
9. Only a few states have genuinely embraced the discovery principle. Alabama
and Connecticut have adopted it by statute, but only with extensive qualifications. See
ALA. CODn ANN. tit. 7, § 25(1) (Supp. 1955) (generally, two years from act; but,
if not discovered within that time, then within six months of discovery, but not more
than six years after the act) ; and CONN. GzN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958) (one year from
act or from actual or constructive discovery, but not more than three years after
the act). See, e.g., Hemingway v. Waxler, 128 Cal. App. 2d 68, 274 P.2d 699 (1954)(in action against doctor for improper diagnosis of fractured leg, limitation began
to run when plaintiff was informed that leg was fractured) ; Costa v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953) (in action against hospital
and certain doctors for improper diagnosis and treatment of cancer, limitation does
not begin to run until actual or constructive discovery) ; City of Miami v. Brooks,
70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954) (in action for overdose of x-ray treatment, limitation does
not begin to run until notice of the consequences of the alleged negligence) ; Billings
v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) (in action for
negligent failure to remove gauze sponge after operation, cause of action does not
accrue until patient actually or constructively learns of the presence of the foreign
object in his body) ; Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934) (not necessary
for defendant doctor to have had knowledge of his own wrongful act in order for
statute, under the fraudulent concealment theory, to be tolled until plaintiff's discovery).
See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2. 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (now 64 Stat. 1125 (1950)), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act' prohibits the acquisition by one
corporation of the stock of another when the effect "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," in "any
line of commerce in any section of the country." Section 44 of the act
provides a right to sue for treble damages to anyone injured by a
violation of any of the antitrust laws. Defendant claimed that a sec-
tion 4 recovery could not be obtained as a result of a section 7 viola-
tion and based its contention on three decisions" which apparently
prohibited such a recovery. These cases rested on the ground that any
damages claimed for a section 7 acquisition would be merely specula-
tive, since the violation occurs at the moment of acquisition, but the
injury will not occur until the future, when competition is actually
lessened. In the principal case, however, plaintiffs had already lost
their distributorships. Consequently, the court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss and held that since plaintiffs are presently injured -
their damages are in no way speculative - they can state a claim for
treble damages under section 4.
In recent years the private antitrust suit for treble damages has
begun to flourish. 6 Prior to 1940, there were only ten successful treble
damage recoveries.7 Today there are many, and often the recovery
exceeds a million dollars.8  Such extensive recovery has caused com-
ment to the effect that the threefold recovery should be discretionary
for incipient violations rather than mandatory,9 but generally the right
to recover treble damages is strongly favored as an effective means of
enforcing the antitrust laws.1" Even so, the availability of the remedy
3. Ibid.
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963).
5. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 329 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964)
(dictum) ; Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Hawaii 1964); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (pretrial order), leave to appeal denied, Misc. No. 1959 (2d Cir., Jan. 24, 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
6. See Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-
Patman Experience, 30 GwO. WASH. L. Riv. 181, 182 (1961) ; Clark, The Treble
Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH.
L. REv. 363 (1954) ; Wham, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Treble Damage
Suits, 43 ILL. B.J. 108 (1954); Note, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 597, 599 (1964).
7. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931)
Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Lawler v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) ; Montague & Co. v. Lowry,
193 U.S. 38 (1904) ; Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 101
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1939) ; American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1930) ; William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1930); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924).
8. E.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194
F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Lowe's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th
Cir. 1951) ; Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa.
1955). See also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961), where the Supreme Court reversed a judgment for $652,074 plus $200,000
in fees, and Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 358 U.S. 100 (1958), where the
court affirmed the dismissal of a suit for $15 million. In the principal case, each of the
two plaintiffs sued for $1,800,000.
9. See ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST REP. 379 (1955).
10. See Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, appear-
ing in HOrFMAN, ANTITRUST LAW AND TEcENIQuES 373, 384 (1963) ; McConnell,
The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 342 (1955).
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for a section 7 violation has been somewhat questionable,1" although
the statute makes no mention of an exception. 1 2 The principal case is
the first to expressly decide the question favorably to the party seeking
the threefold recovery.'"
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - "Voluntarily Un-
employed" Held To Include Relinquishment Of Employment Based
On Collective Bargaining Agreement. Department of Labor & Indus.
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 418 Pa. 471, 211
A.2d 463 (1965). Claimants left work pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement which provided that senior employees would be
employed until their gross earnings received from the employer since
January of the year of employment amounted to five thousand dollars.
These employees were then laid off for the remainder of the year,
being replaced by junior employees. This is commonly known as a
"work sharing" plan.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
since claimants had agreed to the collective bargaining agreement
through their union bargaining agents, they had "voluntarily" left
work and were therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits under the
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law.2 The rationale of
the court's decision was that the program of planned unemployment
created by the collective bargaining agreement was not the type of
unemployment the statute was designed to alleviate.3 By equating the
statutory phrase "involuntary unemployment" with the phrase "through
11. See cases cited note 5 supra. But see Merge Foreign Car Div., Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 1960 CCH Trade Cas. 76688 (W.D. Pa. 1960) and Ozdoba v. Verney
Brunswick Mills, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), where private complaints
for Section 7 violations were upheld against motions to dismiss without question as to
the availability of the treble damage remedy.
12. For discussion as to probable Congressional intent, see Note, 64 COLUM. L.
Rtv. 597, 600-01 (1964). See also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1964), where the Court held that an FTC merger
proceeding suspends the time limit on a related treble damage action.
13. For discussion of the principal case and the cases cited note 5 supra, see
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADn Rw. Rtp. No. 227, B-1 (Nov. 16, 1965).
1. See generally Note, Unemployment Insurance and Current Unemployment
Problems: Work Sharing - An Answer, 16 LAB. L.J. 243 (1965).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802 (1964) provides, "[Aln employee shall be
ineligible for compensation for any week- . . . (b) (1) In which his unemployment
is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause .. "
3. The guidelines set forth in the Pennsylvania statute's declaration of public
policy state, "The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require
the exercise of the police powers ... for the compulsory setting aside of unemploy-
ment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of
their own." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (1964) (emphasis added).
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no fault of their own," the court felt that the statute referred not to
unemployment arranged, agreed upon and sanctioned by the employer
and employee, but rather to unemployment dependent upon the un-
certainties of the economic climate.4 Furthermore, the court felt the
statute was not designed to "be used as an integral part of an
employer-employee contract which is deliberately designed to provide
the employer with a readily available labor force"' at the expense
of the other contributors to the unemployment fund.
In different circumstances, it has been held, even by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court,' that unemployment pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement is "involuntary." The employee is considered
to be entitled to benefits under unemployment compensation laws on
the rationale that the "involuntariness" is to be determined at the time
of the relinquishment of employment, and not at the time of acceptance
of the collective bargaining agreement.7 These courts have rejected
the agency approach by limiting the application of voluntary-quit pro-
visions to separations where the decision to remain employed lay with
the employee alone. However, even under such different circumstances,
some courts hold that any relinquishment of employment pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement is "voluntary, ' 8 adhering to an
agency theory.
The issue in the instant case has not been decided by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland,' but the Maryland Unemployment Compen-
sation Law is similar to Pennsylvania in that it also requires that the
unemployment be "involuntary. 1 0
4. Contra, Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 236
Adv. Cal. App. 348, 45 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1965), noted in 18 STAN. L. Riv. 756 (1966).
5. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
418 Pa. 471, 211 A.2d 463, 469 (1965).
6. Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation Case, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906
(1959) (retirement agreement) ; Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
396 Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492 (1959) (agreement requiring leave of absence for pregnancy).
7. Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 180 Cal.
App. 2d 636, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1960) (agreement requiring leave of absence for
pregnancy) ; O'Donnell v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 166 A.2d 720 (Del.
1961) (intra-union bumping agreement) ; Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13
N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953) (agreement requiring retirement with pension at age
65) ; Myerson v. Board of Review, 43 N.J. Super. 196, 128 A.2d 15 (1957) (agreement
requiring leave of absence for pregnancy).
8. Compare Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., 212 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1965) (employee,
retired under a compulsory retirement provision which was part of collective bar-
gaining agreement, deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits) with
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, 180 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (employee,
retired under a similar pension program, deemed not to have voluntarily left his
employment and thus held qualified for unemployment benefits). See I. M. Dach
Underwear Co. v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d
193 (1956) (unpaid vacation shut-down agreement) ; Bergseth v. Zinmaster Baking
Co., 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958) (retirement agreement) ; In re Malaspina's
Claim, 309 N.Y. 413, 131 N.E.2d 709 (1956) (failure to join union). See generally
44 VA. L. REv. 1343, 1346 (1958).
9. The question of whether unemployment, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, is "voluntary" was raised in Celanese Corp. v. Bartlett, 200 Md. 397,
90 A.2d 208 (1952), but was not decided because the employer did not press the
point before the Unemployment Compensation Board.
10. MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A, § 6(a) (1957). Compare the Pennsylvania decla-
ration of policy, supra note 3, with the Maryland Declaration of Policy, MD. CODg
ANN. art. 95A, § 2 (1957).
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